This paper derives a concentration measure for markets with multiple vertical segments. The measure is derived using a model of vertical contracting where upstream and downstream firms bargain bilaterally and may be integrated. The resulting vertical Hirschman-Herfindahl Index provides a measure of the degree of distortion in the vertical chain as a result of both horizontal concentration in a segment and the degree of vertical integration. Utilisation of this measure would allow competition authorities to distinguish between the differing competitive impacts of upstream and downstream competition, the relative size of integrated firms in each segment and to provide a quantitative threshold test for vertical mergers. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: L40.
1.

Introduction
The use of market share data to form concentration ratios or indexes have become a staple of 'safe harbour' tests for horizontal merger analysis. The US Department of Justice bases its measure of concentration on the Hirschman-Herfindahl Index (or HHI).
This index takes that sum of the squares of the market shares as a measure of concentration. The test has two parts. First, the post-merger HHI is calculated and the level of concentration of the market assessed. Markets with an HHI above 1800 are said to be highly concentrated, those between 1000 and 1800 moderately concentrated and those below 1000 not concentrated at all. Second, based on the level of concentration, the pre-and post-merger HHI's are compared. For unconcentrated markets, any merger is permissible. However, for moderately and highly concentrated markets, only changes in the HHI of less than 100 and 50 respectively will usually be immediately cleared. For mergers outside of these ranges, the DOJ will conduct further analysis as to the merger's competitive effects.
There are many reasons why the HHI might be used as a measure of concentration in competition settings.
1 However, the rationale that lies at the heart of the present paper is grounded in the theory of Cournot oligopoly. If we take the Lerner index (that is, price less marginal cost divided by price) as a measure of the level of welfare distortion in a market, in a Cournot equilibrium, the average Lerner index across firms is the HHI divided by the price elasticity of market demand. In this sense, the degree to which a 1 Perhaps the earliest formal derivation of the HHI in a model of oligopoly was by Stigler (1964) . He modeled the likelihood that a cartel might be unstable in terms of the probability a deviating member of that cartel might attract a disproportionate share of customers in its favour. That share was inversely related to the HHI implying that for greater levels of concentration a cartel might be expected to be more stable. I thank the editor for pointing out this reference.
merger increases the HHI is an indication of the degree to which that merger reduces welfare.
This use of the HHI has been subject to a number of criticisms. First, if two firms with pre-merger market shares of s 1 and s 2 are analysed, the increase in the HHI is usually assessed to be . This involves an implicit assumption that the sum of market shares of the merged firms will not change as a result of the merger. However, if this was really the case, the merger would involve no welfare detriment; something that requires the merged parties to exercise market power by contracting their market shares. Only by using a full equilibrium model can one properly assess a merger's impact (Farrell and Shapiro, 1990) . Second, and on related lines, this analysis does not consider why a firm's market share may be what it is in the first place. Typically, a large market share implies lower production costs and hence, the reallocation of output following a merger may, in fact, be welfare enhancing (Demsetz, 1974) . Finally, competition authorities also have information that flows from the fact that if a merger is proposed, it is likely profitable for the merging parties. This suggests that refinements in the way market shares are used to infer anti-competitive effects can be utilised. These critiques have not deterred competition authorities from using the HHI as a threshold test for the desirability of a merger. In part, this reflects the fact that this use of the HHI represents a conservative threshold test in that, if a merger fails to pass it, further analysis of the full equilibrium effects would be possible. In addition, such an equilibrium analysis would be able to take into account other market and technological conditions that may favour one oligopoly model over another. Given this, in this paper, I consider concentration-based tests that take into account the degree to which merged parties are vertically integrated. In so doing, I utilise recent developments in the theory of vertical contracting that gives a general approach to the competition issues that arise from vertical integration. Those developments describe the nature of competition when contracting over input supply terms are negotiated and, in so doing, demonstrate how vertical integration can be utilised as a means of leverage market power across vertical segments. Importantly, as I will show, this theory gives rise to a natural Cournot-type equilibrium outcome that makes it possible to derive appropriate concentration indexes readily comparable with the HHI (and indeed collapsing to it in a special case).
The recent theory of vertical contracting was a reaction to the Chicago School critique of vertical merger analyses that stated that integration could not be an instrument 3 The US DOJ (1987) and the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (1994) are explicit in their acknowledgement that mergers that increase the level of vertical integration can be undesirable.
for the leverage of market power as firms with such power could leverage that power through arms-length contracting arrangements and non-linear pricing. Hart and Tirole (1990) were the first to develop a special model that demonstrated that when an upstream monopolist negotiated with downstream firms bilaterally and bilateral agreements could not easily be observed by outside parties then a vertically separated monopolist would be constrained to offer supply terms that dissipated monopoly rents downstream. Put simply, each downstream firm did not trust the monopolist to offer supply terms consistent with a monopoly outcome and the monopolist could not commit to those terms publicly. The end result was an oligopolistic outcome across the industry despite the existence of market power in the upstream segment. This baseline result was subsequently demonstrated to be robust to alternative assumptions on competitive instruments (O'Brien and Shaffer, 1992) , information (McAfee and Schwartz, 1994; Segal, 1999; Rey and Verge, 2004) , contracting instruments (McAfee and Schwartz, 1994; Segal and Whinston, 2003) , contract timing (Gans, 2006) , bargaining power (de Fontenay and Gans, 2005) and the presence of upstream competition (de Fontenay and Gans, 2005) .
In this environment, vertical integration is a means of restoring industry-wide monopoly outcomes (Rey and Tirole, 2003) . Put simply, rent dissipation occurred because an upstream firm was tempted to offer downstream firms secret discounts;
imposing negative competitive externalities on other downstream firms. That incentive is mitigated when the upstream firm is integrated downstream as such secret discounts to independent firms harms its own integrated unit. In some cases, the integrated firm has no incentive to supply inputs to other downstream firms and foreclosure and an industrywide monopoly result. In general, vertical integration, particularly by firms with upstream or downstream market power, is a means of raising input prices and softening the strength of competition downstream (de Fontenay and Gans, 2005 As alluded to earlier, one other paper considers concentration tests taking into account vertical structure and integration. Hendricks and McAfee (2005) 
Baseline Model and Concentration Index
Here I provide a model of vertical contracting. It is based on de Fontenay and
Gans (2004) STAGE 2 (Production): Production takes place and payoffs are realised.
As in the vertical contracting literature, it is assumed that there are a set of bilateral Nash bargaining games between upstream and downstream pairs. Each upstream-downstream pair negotiates over price and quantity supply terms. For example, i and j bargain over terms specifying a quantity of inputs purchased, q ij , and a lump-sum transfer, p ij paid by i to j.
The precise game theoretic relationship between the set of Nash bargains is not modeled here. Those negotiations could be simultaneous (as in Segal, 1999; and O'Brien and Shaffer, 2004) or sequential with passive beliefs (as in McAfee and Schwartz, 1994; and de Fontenay and Gans, 2005) . Either approach leads to the same outcome with regard to input quantities traded: that pairwise negotiations between firms over input supply terms will satisfy bilateral efficiency. That is, when pairs cannot contract or observe the outcomes of other negotiations during their own, there exists an equilibrium where they undertake those negotiations holding the outcomes of others as fixed. This means that the quantity of inputs traded will be such that the joint profits of both parties are maximised holding fixed the quantity of inputs expected to be traded as a result of other pairwise negotiations. It is this equilibrium, which is the main focus of the vertical contracting literature, which will be the focus of this paper.
Lerner Index for a Vertical Chain
Consider a representative negotiation between firms i and j over q ij (that quantity supplied by j to i) and p ij (the payment from i to j). That is, in this negotiation, i is the downstream firm while j is the upstream firm (even though each potentially has operations in the other vertical segment). The profits of i and j (written to highlight this quantity and price) are:
's Downstream Profits 's Upstream Profits ( ) (.) ( ,.)
Bilateral efficiency implies that the two firms will agree to a quantity (q ij ) that maximises the sum of (1) and (2) taking as given all other input prices and quantities. This is equivalent to solving:
where
is the market price elasticity of demand. This is the Lerner index for the entire vertical chain in this model. Notice that it depends only on downstream market shares and not upstream shares. The intuition for this is that, in bilateral negotiations, both firms take into account impacts of changes in input supply between them on their downstream profits and this depends on their downstream market shares. The only upstream impacts come through marginal costs but these depend upon the absolute (rather than relative) level and nature of their upstream outputs.
Vertical Hirschman-Herfindahl Index
Let . Utilising (4), the average Lerner index for the industry can be derived. 
Implications for Merger Analysis
In this section, I consider the implications of utilising VHHI for the purpose of merger analysis. In so doing, downstream mergers, upstream mergers and vertical mergers are evaluated in turn.
Downstream Mergers
When all downstream firms in an industry are net buyers of upstream inputs, and horizontal mergers will appropriately be evaluated using the HHI.
Vertical separation of all downstream firms or, conversely, the lack of external trade between integrated firms would similarly satisfy this condition. In these cases, merger analysis will primarily focus on downstream market shares.
VHHI HHI =
It is only where at least one of the merging firms is a net supplier of upstream inputs that the change in concentration will be ( 
Upstream Mergers
When input supply terms are determined by bilateral bargaining, a clear implication is that, under vertical separation, upstream market structure does not matter for overall quantity and price downstream. This is a direct implication of (4) and a generalisation to the case of upstream competition of results that non-integrated upstream monopolies are unable to leverage their market power downstream. 4 Recall, that when firms are not integrated (or more generally integrated firms are net buyers of inputs) the average Lerner index for the whole vertical chain does not depend on upstream market shares. Hence, should upstream firms merge, the VHHI would be unchanged. . Thus, the greater the upstream market share of the merging firms, the greater the increase in VHHI. In addition, the greater the degree of vertical integration amongst merging firms, the greater the potential competition concern from upstream mergers.
Vertical Mergers
While the above analysis indicates the potential changes in horizontal merger analysis based on alternative vertical market structures it is in the analysis of vertical mergers that the VHHI is at its potentially most useful. To date, competition authorities have not been able to provide bright-line safe harbour tests for vertical mergers. The USDOJ (1984) alludes to the degree of concentration in a vertical segment as being of issue in its evaluation but there is no further guidance beyond this. To be sure, the level of upstream competition does, in fact, play an important role in mitigating adverse competitive consequences from vertical mergers (de Fontenay and Gans, 2004) . But precisely how much competition is required for this has to date been unknown.
The VHHI provides guidance on this front. First, it provides a baseline measure of the level of relevant concentration over the entire vertical chain to determine whether an industry facing a vertical merger should be considered concentrated or not. Second, it
suggests that the nature of the vertically integrated firm; that is, whether it ends up a net supplier of inputs or not is important. Finally, it provides a way of considering mergers between firms with differing degrees of vertical integration.
To see this, let's begin with a situation where no firm in an industry is integrated.
A merger between any upstream and downstream firm is pure vertical integration.
Imagine that there are 4 equal sized upstream firms and 10 equal sized downstream firms.
In this case, prior to the merger the upstream HHI is 2500, the downstream HHI is 1000
as is the VHHI. If one upstream and one downstream firm merge, the upstream and downstream HHI's remain unchanged whilst the post-merger VHHI becomes 1150. In this case, if we applied the same thresholds as the USDOJ utilising the VHHI, this would be regarded as a moderately concentrated industry and hence, the merger would violate those thresholds.
In contrast, imagine that there are 8 downstream firms with market shares of 10% each and an additional firm with a market share of 20%. In this case, if that larger downstream firm should merge with an upstream firm, the pre-and post-merger upstream and downstream HHI's would be 2500 and 1300 respectively while the pre-and postmerger VHHI's would be 1300 and 1400. Utilising the USDOJ thresholds, this mergeragain in a moderately concentrated industry -would just satisfy the threshold for a safe harbour.
Thus, despite effectively a higher presumptive level of concentration in each vertical segment and a merger creating a significantly larger firm in the second example that merger is potentially less anti-competitive. The reason is that while at least 60 percent of the integrated firm's output will be sold to other downstream firms in the first case, only 20 percent will be sold to those firms in the second. Thus, the potential for negotiations with those firms to have a significant overall effect on competition is much lower.
These examples demonstrate the usefulness of the VHHI measure. Not only does it take into account upstream and downstream competition where relevant but it also takes into account the likely position of the vertically integrated firm. When that firm is not a significant net supplier of inputs, then the likely anti-competitive effects arising from it are likely to be lower.
But the VHHI also allows us to consider more carefully the overall industry-wide effects of a vertically integrated and a non-integrated firm. For instance, building on the first example, suppose that the vertically integrated firm there (with a 10% downstream and 25% upstream share) was to merge with another downstream firm. In this case, because the only segment both firms operated in would be the downstream segment, it is likely that competition authorities would evaluate the merger on that basis. In that case, the downstream HHI would change from 1000 to 1300 and be regarded as presumptively anti-competitive.
In contrast, using the VHHI, the merger would change it from 1150 to 1400.
While still presumptively anti-competitive, the magnitude of the change in concentration in significantly less. Put simply, the nominally horizontal merger makes the integrated firm a relatively smaller net supplier and this effect mitigates the usual anti-competitive concerns based on an analysis of concentration in a single segment.
Concentration Measures in Successive Cournot Oligopoly
In some markets, firms may not be able to negotiate over non-linear prices and may be constrained to offer linear ones. As is well known, this gives rise to the problem of double marginalisation: a problem that can be resolved by vertical integration.
Consequently, a vertical merger may have an anti-competitive effect of the type described earlier along-side a pro-competitive one in terms of eliminating double markups. It is, therefore, instructive to consider a vertical concentration measures that takes each of these effects into account.
Here Thus, in contrast to the previous model based on bilateral bargaining, input prices are simple per unit prices only and hence, will involve upstream firms earning a marginal above their marginal cost for external sales.
Given this set-up, the following proposition states the analogue to the concentration measure derived in Proposition 1.
Proposition 2. Under linear downstream demand and costs, the vertical HHI in the successive Cournot oligopoly model is:
2 2 2 1 1 11 11
Notice that this is the sum of the upstream and downstream HHI's less a term that reflects the lack of distortion for internal trade within a firm and plus a distortion reflecting the concentration of external trade between firms. 
Notice that for the case where there are two upstream and downstream monopolists, this becomes 3/ε. This implies that the equilibrium level of ε would have to be greater than 3.
This reflects the multiple distortions arising from double marginalisation. Finally, notice that for a bottleneck monopolist in a segment with perfect competition in the other segment, the index reduces to 1. In this model, all other things being equal, horizontal mergers are distortionary while vertical mergers improve efficiency. However, what this allows is for a consideration of these offsetting effects when vertical mergers occur that increase horizontal concentration in either or both upstream and downstream markets. We demonstrate how this applies in the next section.
Application
As an illustration of how these concentration measures may be useful in providing guidelines for merger analysis, I consider here (as did Hendricks and McAfee, 2005 ) the impact of the Exxon and Mobil merger on the California petrol retailing market. Hendricks and McAfee (2005) study this market because of its relative isolation to the rest of the United States (for transportation and regulatory reasons). However, their focus is not on concentration measures as a threshold test for competitive concern but on a full analysis of the impact of the merger on intermediate and final good prices. Nonetheless, using the threshold tests here yields similar conclusions. market shares than upstream ones. Thus, each is a net purchaser in the wholesale petrol market and will remain so following the summation of their market shares. Table 2 reports various concentration measures. The first two columns are the pre-and post-merger concentration measures based on a simple summation of market shares (as would occur in threshold tests). Notice that, for the first three measures, the threshold requirements for the USDOJ would not be met as either the post-merger measure was highly concentrated or the merger raised the concentration measure by more than 100 points. Notice, however, that the percentage increase in the VHHI (Contracting) measure (9.6%) is greater than the VHHI (Cournot) measure (7.1%) because the latter involves an efficiency benefit as a greater proportion of wholesale market trade is internal to an integrated firm while the former involves a large increase in downstream concentration; something that causes greater competitive distortions in the contracting model. This is not to suggest that concentration measures alone should dictate whether a merger should be opposed by competition authorities. 7 Here, however, in establishing threshold guidelines for competitive concern, measures that take into account vertical issues can be very useful in cases where proposed mergers involve parties with market power in one or both vertical segments. Moreover, for mergers that are purely vertical, these measures provide a new approach to setting quantitative guidelines.
Conclusion
In conclusion, the analysis here demonstrates that the evaluation of mergers involving or creating integrated firms is more nuanced than purely horizontal mergers without any cross-segment impacts. Vertical mergers create anti-competitive concerns through a different path than the unilateral effects created by pure horizontal mergers. In addition, horizontal mergers involving integrated firms can sometimes create outcomes that balance the usual anti-competitive concerns regarding such mergers. The use of the VHHI rather than a segment-level HHI as the basis for threshold tests captures these differing effects.
Of course, it would also be instructive to build the analysis here into the equilibrium analyses like Farrell and Shapiro (1990) . After all, like horizontal mergers in Cournot oligopolies, vertical integration when there is upstream competition may also not be privately profitable (de Fontenay and Gans, 2005) . As such, the fact that a vertical merger is proposed contains additional information regarding its likely anti-competitive effects. That type of analysis is, however, left for future work. / ) 
Proof of Proposition 2
Working backwards, in this model, if i is non-integrated, its downstream profits are given by:
. Maximising this with respect to x i (holding other downstream quantities as given) gives the (inverse) input demand function: 
Note that (7) implies that: 
